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The Disputed Wills, Trusts and Estates team acted for the executor in the recent High Court judgment of O’Herlihy v Taylor and Upsdell [2026] EWHC 505 (Ch) (O’Herlihy).
The case provides valuable guidance on the Court’s approach to out‑of‑time claims brought under Section 4 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (1975 Act).
This article is the first in a two‑part series considering the key lessons arising from the judgment.
Background
Hugh Ian Taylor died on 2 June 2019, leaving a net estate of approximately £38.5 million.
Under the terms of his Will, and subject to pecuniary legacies totalling £400,000, the residuary estate passed to his wife, Jennifer Taylor.
Made in Chelsea star Lonan O’Herlihy (who markets himself as “the Posh PT”) sought to bring a 1975 Act claim against Mr Taylor’s estate, alleging that he had been treated as a ‘child of the family’ during his mother’s relationship with him. Their relationship ended in around 2005, and all contact between Mr Taylor and Lonan had ceased by 2012. Mr Taylor subsequently married Jennifer.
Despite receiving no financial support from Mr Taylor during at least the final seven years of Mr Taylor’s life, Lonan contended that the Will did not make reasonable financial provision for him.
Under section 4 of the 1975 Act, a claim must be issued within six months of the date of the grant. As Lonan sought to issue his claim more than four years after that deadline had passed, a preliminary issue hearing was required to determine whether the Court should grant him permission to bring the claim out of time.
The Court refused to grant Lonan permission, holding that his delay was both significant and largely unexplained. Lonan was not helped by the Court’s assessment that the underlying claim was also unmeritorious – Mr Taylor owed no obligations or responsibilities to Lonan at the time of his death, Lonan was financially self‑sufficient and he could not demonstrate that reasonable financial provision was required.
Key learnings for executors
We set out below three key ‘takeaways’ from O’Herlihy for executors who may find themselves in these circumstances.
1. Distribution is not a shield
Executors can be forgiven for breathing a sigh of relief when the six-month post-grant date arrives with no hint of 1975 Act claim and when no proceedings materialise in the four months that follow.
Executors should, however, be mindful that 1975 Act claims can still be brought long after the limitation period has expired. The Court’s discretion to allow a late claim is broad and the fact that an estate has already been distributed will not automatically prevent the Court from granting permission.
In O’Herlihy, the estate had been administered and largely distributed by 2021. Master Henderson noted that executors and beneficiaries may, in theory, be required to unwind distributions if justice requires it. Distribution therefore cannot be relied upon as a complete shield.
An executor who has properly administered and distributed an estate more than six months after the grant is generally protected from personal liability (section 20 of the 1975 Act). However, that protection does not prevent the administrative and practical burden of responding to a late application.
Whilst executors should not necessarily delay distributing estates out of fear of a claim, they should be alive to the possibility of late litigation and should carefully review the risks of this and plan accordingly. It is a salient reminder of the often-forgotten gravity of the role.
2. Neutrality
This will be a familiar concept, but it is imperative to keep it ‘front and centre’ when advising executors, not least in relation to costs recovery. Ultimately, the executor’s responsibility is to facilitate, rather than influence, the Court’s determination of whether permission should be granted on the facts.
In O’Herlihy, the executor adopted a neutral stance throughout, participating solely to assist the Court in answering questions concerning the administration of the estate and addressing any potential criticism of his conduct. He did not adopt an adversarial position in relation to the substantive dispute between Lonan and Jennifer.
This case reminds us that caution should be exercised by claimants when alleging any departure from neutrality. Unhelpful criticism of an executor’s conduct, which is not supported by the facts, can add to the issues to be resolved by the Court and the way in which the Executor is required to participate in any proceedings – increasing all the parties’ costs.
3. Estate transparency
It is essential that an executor is transparent about the administration. The Court relies on accurate information about what steps have been taken, when assets were distributed, and whether any funds remain available. This goes directly to assessing prejudice, which is one of the factors the Court must weigh up when it is deciding whether to allow a late claim.
The judgment in O’Herlihy illustrates the importance of this duty and the executor was transparent about the timing of the administration. This was relevant to the Court’s finding that reopening the estate would cause undue prejudice to Jennifer, and it was a factor in the Court’s decision to refuse permission.
Transparency protects executors from criticism. A lack of detail can give rise to allegations of delay, mismanagement or unfairness, any of which can unnecessarily complicate proceedings or lead to potential personal cost consequences for the executor.
Ultimately, O’Herlihy serves as a reminder that the expiry of the statutory deadline is not always the ‘end of the story’. Executors who plan ahead, remain neutral, and maintain clear records place themselves in the strongest possible position should they be required to respond to an out-of-time 1975 Act claim.
For any advice on how to manage these situations or if you have any queries about 1975 Act claims, please contact Jasmine Ivory.
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