Print article
Authors
Authors
On 16 September 2025 the First-Tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) handed down their judgment in the case of James Blann v Cookhill Cricket Club Limited [2025] UKFTT 1155 (PC).
This was a case focused on the doctrine of resulting trusts and concerned a dispute between an unincorporated members club (the Club) and an incorporated cricket club (the Company) as to the beneficial ownership of a cricket ground (the Cricket Ground).
James Blann, who was the Chairman of the Club, asserted that the Club held a beneficial interest in the Cricket Ground by way of a resulting trust, as a result of grant applications and other contemporaneous evidence from the time of the Cricket Ground’s sale. The Company argued instead that they owned the full beneficial interest in the Cricket Ground outright.
Below, we look at the key issues and outcomes arising from the judgment.
The background
The Club was established in 1946 and moved to the Cricket Ground in the early 1960s. At the time, it occupied the Cricket Ground under a lease from the then owner, Whitbread. In 1995, Whitbread decided to sell the Cricket Ground and offered it to the Club to buy. The purchase price was negotiated by the Club down to £20,000.
To raise funds for the purchase, the Club made two applications for funding: one to the Lottery Sports Fund and one to the local district council (the Applications). These had the stated purpose of ensuring that the Club would be able to purchase the Cricket Ground.
Both Applications successfully yielded grants, however the funding provided by both grants only amounted to £12,000, meaning there was an £8,000 shortfall. There were also provisions in the funding agreement for the money to be clawed back by the providing organisations if the Club did not adhere to the terms of the agreement by using the money to purchase the Cricket Ground.
The Club’s membership was unable to cover the £8,000 shortfall, and after taking financial advice the Club decided to form a limited company to assist with purchasing the Cricket Ground. It was also resolved that the Club would pay an agreed rent to the Company for occupation of the Cricket Ground after its purchase by the Company.
On 25 November 1997 the Company was incorporated. This crucially allowed for investments to be obtained from outside the Club, which would cover the purchase price shortfall, but which would be protected by way of shareholdings in the Company. Following a mixture of investments from Club and non-Club members, the purchase price shortfall was eventually covered and each investor received shares in the Company equal to their contribution.
Following the completion of the purchase, on 13 March 1998 the Cricket Ground was registered in the sole name of the Company.
The claim
The basis of the Club’s claim was that they had a beneficial interest in the Cricket Ground because the grant funds used to purchase the Cricket Ground were granted to the Club, should be treated as the Club’s own money and therefore a resulting trust arose in its favour.
The Company was unrepresented at the hearing but argued that although the Applications were made in the name of the Club, incorporation later became necessary as a means of advancing the purchase of the Cricket Ground. It was also argued by the Company that the individuals in charge of the Club at the time were aligned that the Cricket Ground was to be beneficially owned by the Company only, as a means of protecting the investments of outside investors by way of holding shares in the Company.
What is a resulting trust?
A resulting trust is a type of trust that arises where, in certain circumstances, trust property reverts back to the person from whom it originated. For example, where the initial beneficiaries of a trust die and no further beneficiaries are named, the trust property will revert back to the settlor. Another example is where property is held by someone other than the person who provided the purchase money; in this instance the property is presumed to belong to the person who provided the purchase money unless there is evidence to show otherwise.
The judgment
The Judge found that a resulting trust in favour of the Club had not arisen.
The Judge highlighted that the funds advanced by the grants were not unrestricted and were not therefore the Club’s outright; they would have been paid back to the funders had the purchase of the Cricket Ground not completed. The Judge found that the Club couldn’t properly say that the grants represented their contribution to the purchase price; at best they could say that they had procured the funding.
The Judge also highlighted that the solicitors involved in the conveyancing of the Cricket Ground had acted initially for the Club, and then for the Company. In the Judge’s opinion this supported an assumption that the solicitors would have cleared the change in purchaser with both the Lottery Sports Fund and the local district council before using the grant money to proceed with the purchase of the Cricket Ground.
To consolidate the judgment, the Judge also held that the contemporaneous evidence from the time of the purchase showed that it was intended for the Company to hold beneficial ownership of the Cricket Ground outright. This contemporaneous evidence included minutes from Club meetings showing concern over the shortfall in the purchase price, and the resolution to form the Company to attract outside investment which would be protected by holding shares. Furthermore, the Judge highlighted the fact that the Club was to pay a rent for use of the Cricket Ground to the Company, and other letters expressing that the Company would “in effect own the ground” as further evidence that the intention at the time of the purchase was for the Company to own the entire beneficial interest in the Cricket Ground.
As such, the Judge directed that the Club’s application to register its interest in the Cricket Ground should be rejected by the Land Registry.
Conclusion
This case provides a helpful reminder of the law relating to resulting trusts and what needs to be proved in order to establish that a resulting trust exists. It also provides an interesting examination of the doctrine of resulting trusts in the context of unincorporated members clubs, and how the money paid in funding grants can be used in the purchase of property, which is a common occurrence throughout grassroots sport in England and Wales.
The key takeaway from this judgment is that just because money which appeared to belong to another party has been used in a transaction, it does not mean that the presumption of a resulting trust will necessarily prevail. If there is additional evidence which shows an intention for a legal owner to retain beneficial ownership, or if there is a clear and evidenced rationale behind the legal owner retaining beneficial ownership (in this case allowing investment contributions to be protected by owning shares in the Company) then a resulting trust may not arise.
If you need advice on resulting trusts and how these can arise, or if you have any questions more widely about the co-ownership of land and trust disputes, please contact Sarah O’Grady in the Michelmores Disputed Wills & Estates team.
This article is not legal advice and should not be relied upon or construed as such.